Despite our growing reliance on mobile phones for a wide range of daily tasks, we remain largely in the dark about the operation and performance of our devices, including how (or whether) they protect the information we entrust to them, and with whom they share it. The absence of easy, device-local access to the traffic of our mobile phones presents a fundamental impediment to improving this state of affairs. To develop detailed visibility, we devise Haystack, a system for unobtrusive and comprehensive monitoring of network communications on mobile phones, entirely from user-space. Haystack correlates disparate contextual information such as app identifiers and radio state with specific traffic flows destined to remote services, even if encrypted. Haystack facilitates user-friendly, large-scale deployment of mobile traffic measurements and services to illuminate mobile app performance, privacy and security. We discuss the design of Haystack and demonstrate its feasibility with an implementation that provides 26-55 Mbps throughput with less than 5% CPU overhead. Our system and results highlight the potential for client-side traffic analysis to help understand the mobile ecosystem at scale.
Introduction
Mobile phones now offer users capabilities that rival those of general purpose computers. However, despite the myriad applications they support, mobile systems remain notoriously opaque. Mobile operating systems tightly control access to system resources and traffic. While this helps prevent compromised or malicious apps from wreaking havoc, these security measures pose hurdles for understanding the performance and behavior of mobile apps.
The opacity of mobile systems to monitoring presents two serious drawbacks. First, it makes it very hard for researchers to understand how mobile systems perform in the wild, requiring them to rely upon instrumenting individual phones to run experiments, or privileged access to ISPs to obtain large-scale traffic traces. Second, it opens the door for potentially unchecked exfiltration of personal data by applications, especially since we rely upon these devices for an increasing number of tasks and entrust them with increasingly sensitive data.
Gaining insight into the internal activities of mobile phones currently proves difficult even for experts. Various techniques have provided insight into the general contours of phone operation-from capturing packets on rooted phones [13] and within ISPs [15, 29] to redirecting traffic through instrumented VPNs [26] to static and dynamic analysis [11, 23] of apps. However, none of the currently available methodologies provides a comprehensive view of mobile platform operation and network interaction both at scale and in the wild.
In this paper we propose Haystack, a handset-, traffic-, and user-centric platform for Android devices that provides high-fidelity information about mobile phone operation and network traffic. Our solution combines three key approaches. First, Haystack runs completely in userspace without requiring root permissions, capturing user traffic locally on the device. To do so, Haystack takes advantage of Android's VPN permission 1 to route transmitted packets through a process running in user-space. This process implements a simplified layer-3/4 network stack, conducting traffic analysis while relaying flow contents to the destination via regular sockets. Second, by running locally on the phone Haystack can directly observe crucial app context (e.g., determining the identity of the particular app generating the traffic), device status (e.g., location, screen, and radio state), user-related information (e.g., accounts, messages, recent calls, and contact lists), and the network traffic associated with user activities. Third, to identify privacy leaks more effectively, Haystack optionally intercepts encrypted traffic via a lo- 1 The recent iOS 9 release provides similar VPN capabilities.
cal TLS proxy. The resulting combination of network traffic, app activity, and detailed contextual metadata allows Haystack to provide unprecedented visibility for characterizing mobile traffic and performance, assessing app security, and detecting privacy leaks.
Haystack's contributions are three-fold. First, we introduce an architecture that enables fully device-local, context-aware traffic inspection on commodity mobile devices using a standard app distributable via the usual app stores. Second, we demonstrate that the approach can deliver sufficient performance, with a low resource footprint, to operate in an ongoing fashion with minimal impact on user activity. Third, we demonstrate immediate benefits from Haystack's capabilities by performing a privacy leakage analysis, identifying the types and recipients of sensitive information that apps leak. The combination of ease of installation through a standard marketplace, low performance overhead, and immediate benefit for users gives Haystack the potential to scale to thousands of users, something that has been historically difficult to achieve.
Our results counter the assumption that client-side traffic analysis would be prohibitively resource intensive on mobile devices [22] . We demonstrate that userspace packet forwarding is feasible on Android with 3-9% power overhead and less than 5% CPU overhead. We stress-test Haystack using network-intensive applications and find that it achieves throughput well above that required for modern mobile applications . To demonstrate Haystack's utility to users, we implement a detector for privacy-sensitive information exfiltrated by installed apps and report on the detected leaks.
We have made the Haystack app available on Google Play, currently available on request, but soon publicly [18] . We also plan to open-source the Haystack codebase and release the data that the deployments collect to foster adoption of the platform by the community. 2 We motivate the pressing need for Haystack in § 2 and present its design in § 3. We evaluate Haystack extensively both in lab settings ( § 4) and "in the wild" amongst a small group of volunteers ( § 5). We discuss potential applications of Haystack ( § 6) before summarizing our findings ( § 7).
Background and Related Work
Previous studies have investigated various techniques for understanding performance and privacy risks of mobile apps. The inability to measure traffic in user-space on the device means that these techniques often grapple with 2 We note that UC Berkeley's IRB considered our current data collection process as not-human-subjects research.
issues of scalability (e.g., if they require custom OSes, or manual interaction with apps) and correlating network layer observations with device context (e.g., which apps are running). We divide these previous approaches into three categories: passive trace analysis, static analysis, and dynamic analysis. The first category involves passive analysis of app network traffic, whereas the latter two focus on active, targeted investigation on a per app basis. Passive trace analysis. In the absence of instrumentation on user devices, some studies have investigated the behavior of mobile apps by observing their network traffic, either at a large ISP [15, 29] or by enticing users to leverage a proxy deployed by the researchers [22, 26] . These approaches have the advantage of potential scale (e.g., ∼3M users in a large ISP) but trade off device context such as knowing which application generated the traffic. AntMonitor [22] works to alleviate this issue by pairing a remote VPN proxy with client-side software, forwarding user traffic to a remote VPN server responsible for packet capture. With Haystack we demonstrate that with careful system design it is actually possible to perform VPN proxying on client devices without exhausting system resources (e.g., power, CPU). Dynamic analysis which exercises applications' functionality and monitors app activity (e.g., leakage of privacy-sensitive data) has been a very popular approach. The researcher has control over the device running the app and can monitor device context (e.g., location, current apps, etc.). Dynamic analysis either monitors network traffic (e.g., by using a proxy [21] or placing the app in a VM [31] ) or employs instrumented OSes to track the flow of sensitive information [11, 17] . A key challenge of this approach is scale, in terms of the number of apps tested, and the representativeness and coverage of app behaviors. Manual analysis (e.g., [11, 17, 21] ) can provide more representative usage of the app but remains limited in terms of the number of apps that can undergo testing. In contrast, fuzzer tools like Monkey [2] automate the testing process to increase scale, but often miss common functionality (e.g., passing log-in screens). Static analysis involves analysis of the app code (e.g., decompiling binaries and producing control flow graphs [4, 10] ) and properties (e.g., third-party library use and requested permissions [8, 23] ). More classic static analysis techniques such as symbolic execution, made feasible by constraining analysis to execution paths with potential data leakage, have also been investigated in this space [30] . While these approaches provide good scale, analyzing over 1,000 apps in most cases, they do not necessarily reflect code paths that would be executed in practice.
Related to the above techniques for characterizing information leakage, there has been active investigation of SSL on mobile and using device IDs to obtain access to Haystack architecture design, highlighting the different system components and the data forwarding process for an outgoing packet created by a local application. The solid lines represent the actual forwarding path for traffic generated by mobile apps even if encrypted, whereas the dashed lines represent the off-line path used for privacy and performance analysis.
users' analytics profiles [8] . Fahl et al. showed that most mobile apps do not encrypt the data they send to online servers [12] and Georgiev et al. reveal critical vulnerabilities in how mobile devices validate SSL [14] . Our approach. Haystack aims to avoid the pitfalls of existing approaches by enabling traffic analysis on mobile devices locally and in user space. This allows for wider deployment than approaches that require users to install custom OSes (e.g., [11] ) and allows us to observe information leakage as triggered by real user behavior, as opposed to potential leakage identified via static analysis. Finally, by performing monitoring on the device, Haystack can correlate traffic data with application context, for example in order to provide more accurate identification of applications that leak privacy-sensitive data.
The Haystack System
Our design for Haystack reflects some basic requirements. First, we aim to enable low-overhead and highthroughput real-time traffic analysis, keeping the system's operation as transparent to the user as possible. Second, we desire an architecture that runs in userspace without requiring additional customizations on the phone, such as rooting the device. Third, we aim to support in-depth traffic analysis across the protocol stack, allowing us to add protocol analyzers over time as needed. In the remainder of this section we present our implementation of Haystack in form of an Android app. Our solution consists of three main components, as shown in Figure 1 : the Forwarder, which handles packet forwarding and performs flow reconstruction, the TLS proxy, which intercepts TLS traffic, and the Intelligence Service, which handles payload and traffic analysis off-path, but in near real-time. Haystack's traffic-forwarding logic. The process attempts to balance reading from tun and event-based Java sockets (NIO). With both interfaces idle, the system sleeps to reduce power usage.
ing external libraries we leverage for TLS interception, IP/TCP/UDP packet handling, and geolocation) amounts to 15,000 lines of code, excluding XML GUI layouts.
We begin with a description of Android's VPN API, as it informs Haystack's overall design. We then discuss Haystack's components in turn, and conclude with a discussion of basic limitations of the platform.
User-space VPNs in Android
The Android security model makes it possible for apps to inspect network traffic using one of two methods. The first applies to rooted phones: in this mode, any app can run commands in privileged mode. For example, an app can run tcpdump on the default network interface to access all traffic. The second requires a special Android API. Since 2011 (version 4.0), Android has offered a VPN API that enables developers to create a virtual tun interface and direct all network traffic to a user-space process. This technique is meant for use by VPN client apps to forward arriving packets over a secure connection to a remote VPN server [3] . To enable this functionality, Suspends polling when there is no activity. apps need to request the BIND VPN SERVICE permission. At execution time, users get a warning that an app may monitor their traffic and need to allow the app to use the permission. Once enabled, the app can access network traffic in user space and without root privileges. We note that this feature offers a way around Android's sand-boxing model. Any application granted this permission gets access to all network traffic. Users have to explicitly enable this access by checking an "I trust this application" box and Android reminds the user of VPN presence via its notification bar. Users unfamiliar with VPN operation might not realize the privacy and security implications of these notifications.
Haystack's use of the VPN API Haystack leverages the VPN interface in order to intercept and analyze traffic. Instead of relaying packets to a remote VPN server, Haystack processes the traffic locally and forwards it on to its intended destination. To this end, Haystack uses the Forwarder module to capture and relay traffic between the tun interface and the default system gateway. A key challenge for Haystack is the fact that non-privileged apps may only use regular Java sockets (as opposed to raw sockets) to communicate with remote entities. This means that the Forwarder module has to bridge packetlevel communication on the tun side and flow-level interaction with the outside network as we describe next.
The Forwarder
The Forwarder acts as the intermediary between tun and the network, and makes it possible for Haystack to transparently forward traffic. We now describe the forwarding mechanism and steps we took to implement it efficiently.
Maintaining flow state The Forwarder receives raw IP packets from tun. Ideally, it would just forward the raw packet onto the network. As we have noted previously, doing so would require root privileges. The Forwarder therefore extracts the payload from the raw packet and, if appropriate, sends it to its intended destination through a regular Java socket. As a consequence, the Forwarder must parse the packet to obtain meaningful information about the flow and maintain state (i.e., a transmission control block, updated by the observed IP and TCP/UDP headers) for tun packets destined to a given Java socket. This allows the Forwarder to update and recreate this state before forwarding packets from a given Java socket back to the tun interface. In other words, the Forwarder performs the role of a layer 3/layer 4 translator, including a simplified TCP stack.
Handling UDP and TCP headers The nature of state required by the Forwarder differs markedly for UDP and TCP. A simple flow-to-socket mapping suffices for UDP because of its connectionless nature. Header reconstruction remains easy, even more so in IPv4, as IPv4 does not enforce UDP checksums. (We can assume that the tun interface operates without loss, as it is a local device). TCP state, however, proves more complex: we need to track the TCP state machine and maintain sequence and acknowledgment numbers based on the flow. This is complicated by the fact that we deal with Java sockets, which only expose the notion of streams rather than packets coming from the network, and we do not have any view into the TCP headers, including the flags and window information.
We therefore use a basic TCP header for our communication with tun. When we read a SYN packet from tun, we create a new Java socket, connect to the target, create additional state (the acknowledgment number), store this state, and send a SYN/ACK to tun when the OS establishes the socket. Since we deal with a stream/datagram socket on the network side, we attempt to read fixedsized packets from the network (at a maximum of 1450 bytes); we cannot recreate the exact packet flow that we get from the network onto tun. Since we cannot see TCP flags on the socket, we do not know when the server sends us a packet with a PSH flag. This can prove problematic because the client can wait an indeterminate amount of time to get the data unless the TCP stack gets a packet with the PSH flag set. To avoid this scenario, we set the PSH flag for all packets we write to tun. In future, we plan to test better strategies such as setting the PSH flag for the last packet we read from the buffer before it gets empty. Likewise, the Forwarder handles connection shutdown when it sees an explicit FIN requests from tun, or it infers the end of a connection on the socket side when read or write operation on the socket fails, by exchanging FIN/ACK messages with tun.
Overhead of keeping state Our approach requires the Forwarder to create a socket for each TCP/UDP flow and maintain connection state for it. Because Haystack is a regular non-privileged app, it must obey a hard limit on the number of file descriptors (including sockets) it can keep active at any given time. Exhausting the available file descriptors will prevent Haystack from handling new connections, which in turn disrupts connectivity for applications. Therefore we have to close sockets and flush state periodically. For TCP connections, this is straightforward, as we know (or can infer) when the connection ends. Given UDP's connectionless nature we set a timeout of 15 seconds of idle time for its flows, after which Haystack closes the socket. Longer UDP timeouts can be problematic when applications generate frequent multicast traffic (we discuss this further in § 5), but reduce the overhead of creating/purging state. We are exploring techniques that adapt to the nature of the flows; in particular, we plan to multiplex certain kinds of traffic, such as DNS, over a single UDP socket. Even with intelligent handling, the limit on file descriptors remains a limitation in theory-Haystack will be depleted of file descriptors if an application (or set of applications) open a large number of connections concurrently. As we will see in § 5, we manage to avoid this problem in practice.
Implementing the packet forwarding mechanism efficiently The Forwarder must balance application performance with conserving battery power on the device. This task is made challenging by the fact that the tun interface does not expose an event-based API, thus requiring us to implement a polling scheme which checks the tun and Java sockets (implemented using non-blocking NIO sockets [25] ) for data and forwarding the data from one interface to the other.
Algorithm 1 gives pseudocode for the polling procedure. It reads up to max read tun packets from tun or up to max read nio sockets from the NIO (socket) interface before switching to the other interface. This prevents either operation from starving. Each read operation in tun potentially becomes a write operation for sockets, and vice versa. Pure TCP ACKs from tun form a special case. We discard these since the Java socket handles ACKs transparently. tun writes complete very quickly and socket writes do not block, so we perform them immediately upon reading a packet from the current interface. If no packets or flows are read for a total of max idle cycles consecutive iterations of the main while loop, the Forwarder will sleep for idle sleep milliseconds. This reduces power usage when no data transfer occurs, at the cost of slightly increased traffic latency.
We note that tun reads yield packets, whereas NIO socket reads happen on streams. Therefore, each NIO read event potentially yields multiple packets, whereas reading from the tun interface returns a single packet. This makes the Forwarder more efficient for downstream traffic because the overhead of polling is amortized over potentially multiple packets. While this could impact tun operations if the buffers grow large, we have not observed this in practice. We note that even if this situation arises we can easily resolve it by setting a volume limit on individual NIO read operations.
Haystack suspends polling during periods of inactivity to conserve battery and minimize CPU overhead. However, this resource conservation implies a latency tradeoff, as packets that arrive during this idle time must wait for the polling to resume before being forwarded. We consider the trade-off between resource conservation and performance in depth in § 4.2. We summarize the parameters that manage the poll and sleep cycles, as well as their impact on performance, in Table 1 . We note that max read tun and max read nio do not have any impact on performance over a wide range of values. However, as we show in § 4, max idle cycles and idle sleep have a significant impact on overhead and performance.
Other considerations The VPN service (and therefore the Forwarder) gets disrupted when users roam between different networks (e.g., moving between 3G and WiFi, or between different WiFi networks) or when a network black-out occurs. Haystack identifies such events and tries to reconnect seamlessly. Similarly, phone calls disable the data network interfaces, thus stopping the VPN service. While currently this disables Haystack, we are working on using Android APIs to identify when the calls complete so we can transparently restart the VPN. The Forwarder also provides IPv6 support, except for extended headers. We have not noticed any performance issues on IPv6 flows due to this limitation. The VPN interface does not intercept DNS traffic by default; however, we configure a default DNS server so that we can also intercept DNS queries.
TLS Proxy
A key impediment for inspecting Web traffic is the increasing use of encryption technology, particularly TLS. Haystack addresses this challenge by employing a transparent man-in-the-middle (MITM) proxy for TLS traffic [7] . At install time Haystack prompts the user to install a self-signed Haystack CA certificate in the user CA certificate store (which they may accept or decline). We customize the message shown to users at this time, to explain why Haystack intercepts encrypted traffic.
Identifying and initiating proxied TLS flows While Haystack runs, the Forwarder monitors for TCP streams beginning with a TLS "Client Hello" message and forwards these flows, along with flow-tuple metainformation the proxy requires in order to connect to the server (e.g., IP address, port, SNI), to the TLS proxy.
The proxy uses this information to connect to the remote host and reports back to the Forwarder whether the connection was successful or not. If successful, the proxy fetches the TLS certificate from the remote host and generates a new certificate and key-pair signed with the private key of the Haystack CA certificate. It then uses this certificate to establish a TLS connection between the proxy and client application. Upon successful establishment of the client and server connections, the proxy decrypts incoming traffic from each of the parties, re-encrypts it with the appropriate key, and relays it to the other party. It also sends the decrypted contents to the Intelligence Service in the process.
Exceptions in TLS interception
Our TLS proxy will not be able to intercept the flow if the client application uses TLS extensions that are not supported by Haystack, bundles its own trust store, or implements certificate pinning. The same occurs if the server expects to see certain TLS extensions not supported by Haystack in "Client Hello" or if it performs certificate-based client authentication. To allow such applications to bypass the proxy, we add apps with failed TLS handshakes to a whitelist which bypasses the TLS proxy for a period of five minutes. Experiences with our pilot study indicate that apps recover gracefully from TLS failures. After five minutes we remove the app from the whitelist to account for transient failures in the handshake process. While we cannot decrypt all or parts of the traffic of these applications, we can still record which apps take these security measures and potentially communicate more securely.
Security considerations Since using one shared certificate and key-pair combination across all installs exposes users to man-in-the-middle attacks, Haystack generates a unique certificate and key-pair for each new installation of the app. Additionally, Haystack saves the private key to its private storage to prevent other applications from accessing it. While these precautions still permit malicious applications with root access to retrieve the key, such apps can already tap into the user's encrypted traffic without using Haystack's CA certificate (e.g. by surreptitiously injecting their own CA certificate into the system's trust store).
Intelligence Service
Network flows pass from the Forwarder and TLS proxy (after decryption) to the Intelligence Service (IS). IS augments these flows with contextual information, and performs analysis of app and protocol performance.
Enabling off-path traffic analysis The operations that the IS performs could negatively affect the user experience if done in-path: tracking flow and packet statistics, and parsing protocol content can consume valuable CPU cycles. We therefore implement IS as an off-path component that performs those actions outside of the forwarding path. Unfortunately, low-latency communication between Android services can prove tricky to realize, especially in multi-threaded systems. In our implementation we use Java's thread-safe queues for communication. In traffic-intensive scenarios these blocking queues can become a bottleneck as a result of continuous reads and writes between the VPN Service, TLS Proxy, and Intelligence Service [19] . According to third-party benchmarks, alternative concurrent queue implementations provide similar performance [9] . We evaluate the overhead of running the IS in § 4.5 and show that the overhead does not affect even resource-heavy applications. However, we are currently exploring using other techniques such as sockets to reduce this overhead and improve performance even further.
Application and entity mapping The IS receives TCP and UDP data from the Forwarder and the TLS proxy. It maps these streams to applications using a two-step process: it extracts the PID of the process that generated the flow from the system proc directory, and then maps this PID to an app name using Android's Package Manager API. Compared to network-based studies which rely on the HTTP User-Agent or destination IP address, this allows us to obtain highly accurate flow-to-app mappings. Since reading the PID and mapping applications requires file-system access for each new flow, we cache recently read results to minimize overhead. DNS analysis IS conducts protocol analysis of the received traffic. Due to lack of space we here focus on one such protocol, DNS. IS tracks DNS transactions to extract CNAME records, which allows us to map flows to target domains rather than just IP addresses. This gives us the ability to distinguish apps sending data to their own backend as opposed to third-party ad/analytics services, even if both reside in the same cloud service provider [6] .
Detecting privacy-sensitive information leakage As an example of protocol-independent app-layer traffic analysis, we have implemented a private-information leakage detector. To this end, IS first obtains a list of potentially sensitive data from the device, such as hardware and network information, OS fingerprints, historical geographic location, as well as contact and account details. Using the Aho-Corasick algorithm [1] it then scans each flow for the presence of strings in the list. We group the possible content patterns into sets based on their type (e.g., contacts, accounts) and frequency with which they will update (e.g., device location will change frequently, whereas the IMEI will not), and generate state machines for each set. This allows us to regenerate state machines for only those sets whose information has changed. During scanning, we take into account elementary encodings, such as Base64. We hasten to point out that our goal here is not to construct a flawless leak detector operating purely at the network level; rather, we use this scenario as an example for meaningful content analysis.
Limitations
Haystack currently has a number of limitations, some of which are fundamental and result from the limitations of user-space apps in Android. The most serious limitation to Android apps running in user-space is the standard UNIX file descriptor limit. For normal apps this does not present a serious limitation, but for a VPN app that opens a new socket for every flow it can become a problem unless one handles socket resources prudently. Haystack aggressively closes sockets as soon as it finishes handling TCP teardowns and UDP flow timeouts. While this works well for normal operations, we have seen that some apps send high-rate Bonjour and multicast traffic when connected to WiFi networks. This quickly exhausts the file descriptor quota. We currently sidestep this problem by simply ignoring such traffic. In future we plan to multiplex sockets in this scenario.
Another limitation stems from the ability to create only TCP and UDP sockets via Android's APIs, thus excluding protocols such as ICMP. On Android, only one application can use the VPN interface at a given time, and therefore Haystack will not run if another app is actively using the interface. Finally, some vendor-locked phones prevent apps from writing to the trusted root store. In such cases, we cannot intercept TLS traffic.
Performance Evaluation
Haystack aims to enable real-time traffic analysis in user space on mobile phones without negatively affecting performance (e.g., latency, throughput), while managing system resources (e.g., CPU, battery life) efficiently. We evaluate to what extent we achieve this goal in practice.
Testbed and Measurement Apparatus
To evaluate Haystack in a controlled setting, we set up a testbed with a Nexus 5 phone and a Raspberry Pi connected to a dedicated wireless access point. The Nexus 5 is connected over a 5 GHz 802.11n link, while the Pi is connected over a gigabit Ethernet link. We minimize background traffic on the phone by only including the minimal set of pre-installed apps and not signing into Google on the phone. We measure the latency of Haystack using simple UDP and TCP echo packets with inter-packet time varying randomly between 5 and 25 ms. For non-TLS throughput tests, we use a custombuilt speed-test that opens 3 parallel connections to a server for 15 seconds in order to saturate the link. We test uplink and downlink separately. For profiling TLS establishment latency and downlink speed-test, we cannot use our speedtest, as it does not employ a TLS session. Instead, we download a 1B and 20M object, respectively, over HTTPS from an Apache 2 web server with a selfsigned x.509 certificate. We repeat each test 25 times.
While our testbed allows us to explore the design space in terms of many parameters, Android's VPN security model precludes full automation of our experiments. While we are able to write an app to generate traffic automatically, user interaction is required to enable/disable the tun interface. Thus we focus on the impact of max idle cycles and idle sleep and fix max read tun and max read nio to 100 which favors downlink traffic.
CPU and Power Overhead
We investigate the impact of max idle cycles and idle sleep on resource usage, in particular CPU load. CPU usage impacts interactivity of foreground apps, and also serves as a proxy for battery usage. We then use a power meter to directly analyze Haystack's impact on battery life. We focus on Haystack's performance both in the idle state and with heavy usage, streaming a highresolution video. Optimizing Haystack's CPU overhead during idle periods is critical to maximizing battery life, as phones remain idle the majority of time [5] .
CPU load during idle periods We measure the base CPU usage of the Nexus 5 to be 2% in the absence of Haystack, when the system is idle: with its screen off, with normal background activity from installed apps, and push notifications turned on. Figure 2 shows the impact of max idle cycles and idle sleep on CPU usage when enabling Haystack. We find that idle sleep has the most significant effect on CPU load; this does not surprise because it determines how long the app sleeps and therefore does not consume CPU. With idle sleep of 1 ms CPU load varies between 45% and 55% for different values of max idle cycles with the Forwarder polling the interfaces at a high frequency. CPU usage drops sharply as we increase idle sleep, to 10.5% and 4.6% with idle sleep at 10 ms and 25 ms, respectively. In contrast to idle sleep, max idle cycles shows little influence on CPU overhead, particularly at idle sleep values greater than 10 ms. This is because max idle cycles is measured in loop cycles (cf. Alg. 1) which take a small fraction of 1 ms each. For idle sleep of 100 ms and max idle cycles of 10 or 100 the overhead of Haystack is negligible, with the CPU usage close to the base CPU usage (horizontal line in Figure 2) . We consider an idle sleep value of 100 ideal for operating during idle periods.
CPU load during interactive periods We next profile Haystack's overhead under heavy load. To do so we run Haystack and stream a 1080p YouTube video. This stresses packet forwarding, CPU usage, and the TLS Proxy, since YouTube delivers the video over TLS. Figure 3 shows the result comparing CPU usage of the YouTube process and the Haystack process over time.
Aside from a short period at the start of the video Haystack's CPU usage remains lower than that of the YouTube application. Crucially, we do not observe delay, rebuffering events, or noticeable change in resolution during the video replay, suggesting that Haystack's performance can keep up with demanding applications.
Power consumption We use the Monsoon Power Monitor [24] to directly measure the power consumed by Haystack. This experiment required a device with removable battery, so we use a BLU Studio X Plus phone running Android 5.0.2 instead of the Nexus 5. We set the voltage to 3.8V and measure power consumption when the phone is idle (with and without the screen on), and when streaming a 33-second high-definition YouTube video. We repeat each test ten times to account for variation in network conditions. Table 2 summarizes the results of our power measurements with max idle cycles at 100 and idle sleep at 1 ms. This configuration represents the worst-case (cf. Figure 2) as Haystack sleeps for only 1 ms before polling the interfaces again. Unfortunately, due to hardware limitations, we could not measure Haystack's power consumption with the screen off. During idle periods with the screen active, the overhead of Haystack proves marginal, with only 3% increase in power consumption. The overhead increases to 9% while streaming a YouTube video.
Latency Overhead
Haystack suspends polling during periods of inactivity to conserve battery and minimize CPU overhead. However, suspending polling also potentially increases latency for packets if they arrive (at tun or at the socket) when the loop is suspended, as illustrated in Figure 4 . In the figure, the packet that arrives during the first idle sleep period endures the remainder of the idle period (t bu f f ), in addition to the forwarding time (t proc ), which includes looking up relevant header state and translating between the layer 3 tun interface and layer 4 NIO sockets. However, the packet that arrives when polling is active does not experience the idle period overhead. We now analyze the latency incurred by packets when running Haystack. Specifically we focus on the impact of max idle cycles and idle sleep and the trade-off between latency and CPU overhead. Figure 5(a) shows the result of our experiments for UDP. When max idle cycles = 1, latency closely follows idle sleep. This is because Haystack aggressive sleeping renders it more likely for packets to arrive when the system is idle, and therefore to have to wait up to idle sleep milliseconds before being processed. With max idle cycles = 100 and idle sleep = 100 ms, we see about 60 ms delay. Reducing idle sleep to 10 ms while keeping max idle cycles at 100 reduces latency to as low as 3.4 ms.
We see similar patterns for TCP connections. In Figure 5(b) we plot connection establishment times for the TCP echo client and server. As expected, high values of max idle cycles and coupled with low idle sleep results in quicker connection establishment. It is worth noting that when the RTT of the link drops below the time it takes to reach max idle cycles, Haystack processes all packets in the TCP handshake without the Forwarder going into idle state.
Our results suggest that it is possible to adapt Haystack dynamically to strike a balance between performance and power. The phone state gives us a straightforward way of determining whether we should be in "performance" mode or "low-power" mode: if the screen is on, it is likely that the user is interacting with applications, and we can switch to performance mode, while if the screen is off, it is likely that the only traffic is generated by background apps, which are more tolerant to delay. There are of course exceptions such as streaming music apps, which we will need to consider; however, in general, Haystack can adapt automatically to the needs of the device and the user.
Finally, we consider the latency incurred by a packet during processing and forwarding (t proc ). To get a sense of how the latter affect performance, we evaluate t proc while running our speed-test app. Table 3 shows the results of our speed-test for TCP and UDP connections. Table 3 : Mean processing time (t proc ) and SEM for Haystack's forwarding operations for TCP and UDP flows. The first packet of a new flow requires a higher processing time.
Processing times for established flows are 141 µs for TCP and 76 µs for UDP, indicating that the packet forwarding should not be a bottleneck for Haystack's performance. The processing times for new connections are larger, especially for TCP, because of the overhead of initiating state for the connection.
Throughput of Haystack
We now investigate the throughput of Haystack. We initially consider only non-TLS traffic to understand the maximum throughput the system can achieve. We use the our speed-test app to measure the throughput for TCP and UDP flows with idle sleep = {10 ms, 100 ms} and max idle cycles = 100. This setting provides us with a good compromise between CPU usage and latency. Figure 5 (c) shows the maximum throughput achieved by Haystack's Forwarder. Haystack can provide up to 17.2 and 54.9 Mbps uplink and downlink throughput, respectively. As expected, when idle sleep increases the throughput decreases, as more packets arrive with the Forwarder in idle state, thus incurring t bu f f er (cf. Figure 4) . Haystack also has a bias towards downstream traffic, which stems from two factors. First, as we discussed in § 3.2, the NIO read operation reads socket streams which may potentially contain multiple packets whereas the tun interface reads only a single packet. Second, the operations required for upstream packets t proc are more computationally expensive (see Table 3 ). We plan to investigate how we can adapt the max read nio and max read tun parameters to achieve more balanced throughput in future work. We note that the performance we report is still in excess of what is required for modern mobile apps.
Intelligence Service Overhead
Although the IS operates off-path, it is CPU intensive and can inflict significant overhead on traffic. Figure 5(c) shows the IS's impact on throughput. In the worst case, it still provides 23.3 Mbps downstream and 10.5 Mbps upstream throughput, enough to satisfy traffic-intensive apps like video-streaming. Even when stress-testing the system with our speed-test, the maximum queueing time endured by packets before being processed by the IS does not exceed 650 ms. The maximum time for stringparsing with Aho-Corasick is 167 ms. This worst-case scenario arises when the queues contain a backlog of at least 1,000 packets. Even under such circumstances, the total processing time remains low enough to provide feedback to users about their traffic in less than a second, e.g., exfiltrated private information.
We believe that there remains significant potential for improving the overhead imposed by the IS. In particular, we plan to investigate better means of communicating between the Forwarder and the IS (e.g., via sockets or IPC) to make it more efficient than the thread-safe queue between the two systems we currently employ. Figure 6 summarizes the overhead of the TLS proxy for different configurations. We first consider the baseline overhead of Haystack without the TLS proxy enabled on TLS connection establishment times (Figure 6(a) ). With an idle sleep of 10 ms the overhead on TLS connection establishment is 218 ms. Increasing idle sleep to 100 ms has a large effect, doubling the TLS establishment time (2.14x). Using the TLS proxy increases establishment time by a further 1.4x with idle sleep at 10 ms, and 1.08x with idle sleep at 100 ms.
TLS Performance in Haystack
The overhead of the TLS proxy on throughput turns out to be milder. (Figure 6(b) ). Compared to not running Haystack at all, the overhead of the TLS proxy is 26-29%for idle sleep = 10 ms and 100 ms, respectively. Despite this decrease in throughput, overall throughput with the TLS proxy is still 26Mbps, which as we demonstrate in § 4.2 is sufficient to play a 1080p YouTube video without impacting performance. which is sufficient for even resource intensive mobile apps (e.g., video streaming). The impact of idle sleep is less extreme on throughput as subsequent packets bring the Forwarder out of the idle state, thus avoiding t bu f f er for the bulk of the transfer. The fact that the TLS proxy reassembles the streams for the Intelligence Service also helps reduce the overhead. 
The Haystack App
Thus far we have explored the design space and trade offs between resource usage and performance of Haystack while varying max idle cycles and idle sleep. Our observations point to the possibility of combining these parameters to adapt to different usage scenarios. We consider two scenarios: 1) when the user is interacting with the device, or there is latency sensitive background traffic (e.g., streaming audio), and 2) when the phone is idle with minimal network activity (e.g., push notifications). In the first case, minimizing latency and guaranteeing the best user experience is critical, whereas in the second case, traffic is delay tolerant [5] . We define them as Foreground and Background modes respectively. Based on our results in the preceding sections we determine that idle sleep =10 ms and max idle cycles =100 gives the best trade off of performance and resource usage for Foreground usage and idle sleep =100 ms and max idle cycles =100 gives the best trade off during Background usage. Table 4 summarizes the overheads and performance for each of these settings.
The Haystack app, currently available for alpha testing on Google Play [18] , adapts to each scenario automatically for the user. In both cases, Haystack delivers enough throughput at low latency overhead to be able to drive high-performance applications such as HD video streaming without noticeable artifacts such as rebuffering. Finally, we put a lot of effort on providing a good user experience, even for non tech-savvy users. Figure 7 (a) (b) Figure 7 : Haystack GUI screenshots.
shows our current GUI design.
Haystack in the Wild
We now investigate the performance of Haystack on realworld user traffic. We instrumented Haystack to log performance statistics and had 9 volunteers run the modified app for an aggregate period of 5 days. Table 5 lists details about this deployment.
File-descriptor management Per § 3.5, Haystack must carefully manage its file descriptor budget when handling network sockets. We observed that some applications generate a large number of UDP broadcast and multicast packets (e.g., mDNS/Bonjour) in a short period of time when connected over WiFi. Currently, Haystack simply ignores them, because otherwise Haystack will consume all available file descriptors. As we explain in § 3.5, we are investigating the possibility of multiplexing UDP flows and adaptive UDP timeouts to release connection state early. The number of file descriptors consumed while browsing the Web with a UDP timeout value of 15 seconds remains less than about 100, far below the process limit of 1024. Web browsing tends to open more sockets than most other OS activities and apps, especially since peer-to-peer applications (e.g., BitTorrent) that open many connections remain rarely used in the mobile context. System stability In § 3.4 we described Haystack's use of thread-safe queues for transmitting messages between components. We measure the size of these queues under real-world load scenarios by sampling queue size statistics at 5-second intervals. On average the size for each processing queue (for both TCP and UDP) remains below 1,000 messages approximately 63% of the time, well Detecting leakage of privacy-sensitive information Finally, we study Haystack's ability to uncover exfiltration of private information. We find privacy-sensitive information exfiltration ubiquitous: we saw about 20,000 uploads of such items, associated with 85 unique applications and services. While most of these instances related to general device information such as device model and OS build ID, we also observed cases of seemingly innocuous information such as ROM build ID and serial number. Such information can potentially aid the unique identification of a handset in the same way as the IMEI could, yet unlike an IMEI, retrieving it does not require special permissions on part of the application. A large fraction of apps, even alternative ROM vendors such as Venom [27] leak this sensitive data not only for their own data collection purposes, but also to online trackers and ad-services (Ookla's Speed Test, Skype, and Ticketmaster). We list examples in Table 6 . Finally, 56% percent of the leaks we detect were transmitted over TLS connections that were successfully intercepted by Haystack. This shows the importance of TLS interception in our quest to understand the mobile ecosystem; analytic services such as Google Analytics and Flurry upload large amounts of user metadata over TLS without using certificate pinning, thereby becoming easy targets for TLS interception. This is especially a problem when the system's CA certificate store has been compromised; and previous studies show that this is a possibility [28] [20].
Future Haystack Applications
Haystack's vantage point between applications and the network gives it a unique opportunity to observe, characterize, and interpose on user traffic. We now outline additional applications that leverage this capability and can drive future mobile device research. Crucially, we can leverage the fact that Haystack runs locally on the device to directly inform users about ongoing activity and enable them to control Haystack's influence on the traffic.
Characterizing mobile traffic and systems Haystack can combine its view into user traffic with contextual information collected on the phone, such as the network type, device location, and radio state to help us study app traffic both vertically (i.e., across network layers) and horizontally (i.e., across mobile providers). We can then equip users with detailed insights about how apps consume their data plan, how they affect battery life, and at which time and locations their performance deteriorates. We can furthermore characterize protocol performance such as DNS lookup and TCP connection latencies, monitor content replica selection, and track adoption of novel technologies like HTTP/2 and QUIC.
Assessing and enhancing app security In addition to the TLS usage profiling we have already described, we can leverage this ability to notify users in real-time of ongoing TLS interception [20] . In addition, Haystack lets us bring to bear a wide range of misuse and anomaly detection methods well-established in the network security community, including behavioral indicators of local compromise, censorship-induced blocking of content, and communication with known-bad data sinks/servers.
App-specific traffic management While we have not explored content-rewriting in this paper, Haystack's inpath location puts it in a natural location to conduct it, possibly redirecting or blocking traffic. Paired with the ability to link apps to flows, Haystack can subject each app's network traffic to individual forwarding policies, including firewall-style dropping, rate-limiting, or routing into separate VPNs to avoid censorship or improve performance.
Characterizing user privacy As our prototypical privacy leak analysis in § 5 has demonstrated, Haystack's ability to analyze both non-encrypted and encrypted flows (with some exceptions), combined with access to user data on the phone, lets us characterize how apps exfiltrate user data, and with whom. Larger deployment would allow us to deepen our view into the mobile advertising and tracking ecosystem, enabling longitudinal tracking of data harvested across services and the apps that employ them.
Summary
We have presented the design, implementation, and extensive evaluation of Haystack, a user-space app for Android that enables fully device-local, context-aware traffic inspection on commodity mobile devices. We have demonstrated that Haystack can deliver sufficient performance with modest resource overhead and minimal impact on user activity. Using a small deployment with 9 volunteers we also demonstrated Haystack's ability to provide meaningful insights to users about how apps handle their private information. Haystack achieves an architectural sweet-spot that makes it easy to install on regular user phones (thus enabling large-scale deployment) while enabling in-depth visibility into device activity and traffic (thus providing installation incentives to the user). We have released Haystack in the Android Play Store for beta testing-currently available on-request-and plan to make it publicly available very soon. Haystack need not be restricted to Android; newer iOS releases also offer the same primitives that enable Haystack on Android. We will also release the codebase and datasets that Haystack collects to the public to help advance mobile systems research.
